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SUPREME COURT
STATE OF WASHINGTON
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No. 98958-3

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF WASHINGTON

LINDA J. ACOSTA,

Petitioner,

vs.

STATE OF WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Respondent.

APPEAL FROM DIVISION II
OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
#52953-0-II

PETITION FOR REVIEW

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I. IDENTITY OF PETITIONER

Linda J. Acosta, petitioner, respectfully requests that this Court accept review of the Court of Appeals decision in case number 52953-0-II terminating review designated in Part II of this petition.

II. COURT OF APPEALS DECISION

Ms. Acosta respectfully requests that this Court review the Court of Appeals decision, affirming the trial court's decision in this case. The Court of Appeals erroneously determined that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor did not apply to Ms. Acosta's negligence case.

A copy of the decision from the Court of Appeals, Division II, terminating review which was filed on July 28, 2020 is attached as Exhibit "A".

III. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the trial court's decision that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor did not apply to Ms. Acosta's medical negligence case when the occurrence producing the injury was respondent's needless delay in scheduling Ms. Acosta's MRI and subsequent surgery, which clearly exacerbated Ms. Acosta's back pain?

IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. *Procedural History*

On April 4, 2017, Ms. Acosta filed a negligence action against the State of Washington for the negligent treatment she received while an inmate at the Washington Corrections Center for Women. CP 1-17.

On December 14, 2018, respondent filed a summary judgment motion to dismiss appellant's case based upon a lack of expert testimony to establish the respondent's negligence. CP 16-325. On January 14, 2019, plaintiff responded to respondent's motion. CP 326-415.

On January 25, 2019, the court granted the respondent's summary judgment motion. CP 452-453.

On February 1, 2019, appellant filed her notice of appeal (CP 454-458). On July 28, 2020, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. This petition for review follows.

B. *Facts*

On or about October 31, 2014, Ms. Acosta was a resident of the Washington Correction Center for Women. On that date, she tripped on a floor mat, fell backwards onto her buttocks and back, and severely injured her back. As a result of her fall, she experienced extreme pain in her right lower back which radiated to her hip and down to her knee. CP 353.

Ms. Acosta received an X-ray on November 13, 2014 which revealed she suffered a compression fracture of L-1 with over 50% loss of the vertebral body.

Over the next year, the loss increased to 60% to 70% and by the time she received her MRI in November, 2015, the loss approached 90%. CP 353-54.

After Ms. Acosta fell, she knew she had been severely injured because her back pain would not go away. Rather, it increased. From the X-ray result, she learned her back was fractured. She asked to see an orthopedic surgeon in November, 2014, and she began requesting an MRI in January, 2015. Between November 2014 and May 2016, she submitted 43 kites asking for an MRI, which she agreed to pay for, the status of my MRI, and the status of my surgery. CP 353-415. A review of the kite responses reveals little, if any, action to assist her, but does reveal the lack of attention she received from the DOC medical staff. Id.

Also, during this time, Ms. Acosta needed the use of a wheelchair for transportation as she could not walk without extreme pain, and a wedge to help relieve my back pain when she slept. Without notice, her wheelchair would be taken from her although medical staff fully knew my condition, and it took over three months for DOC medical staff to provide me a wedge. CP 379, 387-91, 410-11. Again, no reason existed for such delay or the poor treatment she received. Id.

Ms. Acosta saw Dr. Marc Goldman on January 21, 2016. He recommended surgery, but referred her to Dr. Michael Martin for a second opinion, which occurred on March 17, 2016 whereupon her need for surgery was confirmed. Her surgery did not occur until June 6, 2017. Although she understood that scheduling such a surgery can take some time, it takes even

longer when the DOC medical staff fails to do their job and constantly lies about what they were doing about scheduling her surgery. CP 354-55, 412, 414-15.

For unknown and unexplained reasons, she was not allowed to obtain the MRI until November 2015. After the MRI results were known, and her surgery was to be scheduled, she was informed by ARNP Saari that it had been scheduled, but when she checked into this herself, she learned ARNP Saari had lied to her. When she filed her offender complaint and grievance, the response she received was that her surgery was now being scheduled. CP 355, 412, 414-15.

Ms. Saari's conduct of lying to Ms. Acosta about scheduling her surgery was consistent with Ms. Acosta's attempts to obtain the MRI. Absolutely no reason existed for DOC medical staff to ignore her repeated requests for the MRI, particularly since she was paying for it, and no reason existed for DOC medical staff to ignore, and then lie, about whether her surgery had been scheduled. These needless delays extended the time Ms. Acosta was in extreme pain. CP 355.

Ms. Acosta's MRI and surgery were needlessly delayed because of the negligence of the medical staff at the Washington Corrections Center for Women, which included Dr. Colter and ARNP Saari. Both individuals largely ignored Ms. Acosta's pain complaints and requests for medical assistance in obtaining the MRI and scheduling the surgery as outlined in her numerous Health Service Kites. Their response was to give Ms. Acosta more pain medication, which was not helping her condition. CP 355.

Before surgery, Ms. Acosta's back pain was so excruciating she could not do her daily activities such as walking, bathing, dressing herself or using the

restroom. She had to rely upon her cellmates and other individuals who were housed in her unit to assist in her care and wellbeing and often needed emergency assistance because of the extreme pain she was suffering. CP 356, 402-406.

Since her back surgery in June 2016, Ms. Acosta's back pain has substantially diminished to where she is able to walk with a walker. She was not able to do so before surgery. She is also able to take care of her personal needs, such as showering, using the restroom, and dressing herself, whereas before the surgery she needed constant assistance. The needless delay of obtaining the MRI and surgery caused Ms. Acosta to suffer pain for longer than warranted and all delay is attributable to the DOC medical staff. CP 356.

V. ARGUMENT WHY REVIEW SHOULD BE ACCEPTED

Ms. Acosta respectfully requests that this Court accept review of this case as it involves a decision of the Court of Appeals wherein the Court unnecessarily limited the res ipsa loquitor doctrine, and, therefore, this case raises an issue of substantial public interest that the Supreme Court should address.

VI. ARGUMENT

As this Court is aware, the purpose of summary judgment is to avoid an unnecessary trial when there are no genuine issues of material fact. Pelton v. Tri-State Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 66 Wn.App 350, 355, 831 P.2d 1147 (1992). A trial is absolutely necessary, however, if there is a genuine issue as to any material fact. Olympic Fish Products, Inc. v. Lloyd, 93 Wn.2d 596, 611 P.2d 737 (1980); Jacobsen v. State, 89 Wn.2d 104, 569 P.2d 1152 (1977). Thus, a court must be

cautious in granting summary judgment so that worthwhile causes will not perish short of a determination of their true merit. Smith v. Acme Paving Co., 16 Wn.App. 389, 558 P.2d 811 (1976). If a genuine issue of fact exists as to any material fact, a trial is not useless; rather it is necessary. Lish v. Dickey, 1 Wn.App. 112, 459 P.2d 810 (1969). The Court of Appeals reviews a summary judgment decision de novo. Hisle v. Todd Pac. Shipyards Corp., 151 Wn.2d 853, 860, 93 P.3d 108 (2004).

A. EXPERT TESTIMONY IS NOT REQUIRED WHEN RES IPSA LOQUITUR APPLIES TO A MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE CASE.

Medical expert testimony is not required under the circumstances of this case when the respondent's actions, and lack of actions, constitute negligence.

To prevail on a complaint for negligence, a plaintiff must show duty, a breach of that duty, and injury. Hartley v. State, 103 Wn.2d 768, 777, 698 P.2d 77 (1985). In addition, a plaintiff must show that the breach of duty was a proximate cause of his or her injury. Id. In some cases, breach of duty may be proved by circumstantial evidence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Douglas v. Bussabarger, 73 Wn.2d 476, 482, 438 P.2d 829 (1968).

Under circumstances proper to its application, res ipsa loquitur can apply to physicians and hospitals. ZeBarth v. Swedish Hosp. Med. Ctr., 81 Wn.2d 12, 18, 499 P.2d 1 (1972). For res ipsa loquitur to apply, the following three criteria must be met:

(1) [T]he occurrence producing the injury must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence; (2) the injury is caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; and (3) the injury-causing occurrence must not be due to any contribution on the part of the plaintiff.

Miller v. Jacoby, 145 Wn.2d 65, 33 P.3d 69 (2001).

A plaintiff may rely upon res ipsa loquitur's inference of negligence if (1) the accident or occurrence that caused the plaintiff's injury would not ordinarily happen in the absence of negligence, (2) the instrumentality or agency that caused the plaintiff's injury was in the exclusive control of the defendant, and (3) the plaintiff did not contribute to the accident or occurrence. Pacheco [v. Ames] 149 Wn.2d at 436, 69 P.3d 324. The first element is satisfied if one of three conditions is present:

‘(1) When the act causing the injury is so palpably negligent that it may be inferred as a matter of law, i.e., leaving foreign objects, sponges, scissors, etc., in the body, or amputation of a wrong member; (2) when the general experience and observation of mankind teaches that the result would not be expected without negligence; and (3) when proof by experts in an esoteric field creates an inference that negligence caused the injuries.’

Curtis v. Lein, 169 Wn.2d 884, 891-2, 894, 239 P.3d 1078, (2010).

When res ipsa loquitur applies, it provides an inference as to the defendant's breach of duty. Id. at 892. Res ipsa loquitur is inapplicable only where the defendant's evidence completely explains the plaintiff's injury. Brugh v. Fun-Tastic Rides Co., 8 Wn.App.2d 176, 181, 437 P.3d 751 (2019).

A plaintiff claiming res ipsa loquitur is “not required to ‘eliminate with certainty all other possible causes or inferences’ in order for res ipsa loquitur to apply.” Id.

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur recognizes that an accident may be of such a nature, or may happen under such circumstances, that the occurrence is of itself sufficient to establish prima facie the fact of negligence on the part of the defendant, without further direct proof. Thus, it casts upon the defendant the duty to come forward with an exculpatory explanation, rebutting or otherwise overcoming the presumption or inference of negligence on his part." Metro. Mortgage & Sec. Co., Inc. v. Washington Water

Power, 37 Wn.App. 241, 243, 679 P.2d 943, 944 (1984) (citing Morner v. Union P. R.R., 31 Wn.2d 282, 291, 196 P.2d 744 (1948)).

"Negligence and causation, like other facts, may of course be proved by circumstantial evidence." Id. at 243, 679 P.2d 943. "A res ipsa loquitur case is ordinarily merely one kind of case of circumstantial evidence, in which the jury may reasonably infer both negligence and causation from the mere occurrence of the event and the defendant's relation to it."

Ripley v. Lanzer, 152 Wn.App. 296, 215 P.3d 1020, (Div. 1 2009).

As the Court of Appeals noted, the res ipsa loquitur doctrine applies when the following evidence is established:

(1) The accident or occurrence producing the injury is of a kind which ordinarily does not happen in the absence of someone's negligence, (2) the injuries are caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant, and (3) the injury-causing accident or occurrence is not due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff.

Pacheco v. Ames, 149 Wn.2d 431, 436, 69 P.3d 324 (2003).

The Court of Appeals needlessly restricts the res ipsa loquitur doctrine to some type of specialized negligence case. Respectfully, such restriction is inappropriate as "[a] res ipsa loquitur case is ordinarily merely one kind of case of circumstantial evidence, in which the jury may reasonably infer both negligence and causation from the mere occurrence of the evidence and the defendant's relation to it." Ripley v. Lanzer, 152 Wn.App. 296, 215 P.3d 1020 (2009).

Here, Ms. Acosta satisfies all three elements, which then requires the respondent to come forward with evidence that completely explains plaintiff's injuries. See Brugh, supra. Under such circumstances, when material facts exist, a court cannot grant summary judgment.

Here, although Ms. Acosta began requesting the self-paid MRI in January, 2015, she did not receive the MRI until November, 2015. The kites submitted by Ms. Acosta clearly establish the negligence on behalf of DOC in obtaining this needed diagnostic exam. Suffice it to say that had Ms. Acosta not been incarcerated, she would not have been delayed in obtaining the MRI. Clearly the injury Ms. Acosta endured: prolonged pain and disability, was exclusively within the control of the respondent as it had absolute control of Ms. Acosta's liberty.

Ms. Acosta establishes that the unnecessary and unexplained delay in obtaining the MRI and surgery was caused solely by the actions, or more appropriately, the inactions, of the DOC medical staff. The medical staff was solely responsible for facilitating Ms. Acosta's MRI and surgery as Ms. Acosta had no ability, because of her incarceration, to arrange the MRI and surgery herself. As set forth in the kites and grievances Ms. Acosta filed, the medical staff was simply dishonest with Ms. Acosta when seeking to explain the reasons for the various delays. CP 354-55, 412, 414-15. Finally, no evidence exists to suggest that Ms. Acosta contributed to the injury-causing occurrence. As such, the final criteria of the doctrine is satisfied, and she establishes all *res ipsa loquitur* requirements.

Even though DOC policy 600.020 authorizes self-paid medical care, CP 346-352, the negligent activity of DOC staff precluded a timely MRI from being conducted and, therefore it extended the period of time in which Ms. Acosta was in pain. As such, and under the circumstances of this situation, the doctrine of *res ipsa loquitur* applies.

Dr. Martin, who conducted the surgery, stated that the surgery was warranted, CP 62. Although respondent's expert stated that conservative care was appropriate, Ms. Acosta complained of severe back pain as early as January 2015, but did not receive surgery until June, 2016, almost a year and a half late. Ms. Acosta, and Ms. Acosta alone, makes decisions regarding her medical care and treatment, and after she met with Dr. Goldman and Dr. Martin, she opted for surgery to alleviate her pain and disability. Accordingly, expert testimony was not necessary to defeat the respondent's summary judgment motion as the respondent's negligence, and its failure to respond to Ms. Acosta in a timely manner, particularly when Ms. Acosta was paying for the MRI, caused needless delay in her treatment and needlessly prolonged the back pain she experienced.

B. RESPONDENT'S ACTIONS AND INACTIONS CONSTITUTE NEGLIGENCE.

As respondent is well aware, the Offender Health Plan sets forth medical services applicable to Department of Correction's inmates and authorizes care to be paid for by inmates pursuant to DOC policy 600.020. DOC policy 600.020, states as follows:

The Department will provide the opportunity for offenders to purchase health care services not provided per the Offender Health Plan.

CP 346-352.

Here, after Ms. Acosta fell and hurt her back, she began requesting an MRI and advised that she would pay for the MRI as allowed pursuant to this policy. For unknown and unexplained reasons, even though Ms. Acosta sought a self-paid MRI in January 2015, she was not allowed to obtain the MRI until

November 2015. Then, another unnecessary delay of several months occurred before Ms. Acosta received back surgery, which, for the most part, alleviated the pain she had been experiencing.

As set forth within Dr. Colter's declaration, Dr. Colter was aware of the L1 compression fracture that indicated Ms. Acosta had over 50% loss of the vertebral body height. CP 211. From that point, Ms. Acosta's condition did not improve. She continually complained of significant back pain, needed a wheelchair to mobilize, needed the assistance of her cellmates and other inmates within her unit, and was in extreme discomfort. CP 356.

As noted within respondent's motion for summary judgment:

On January 23rd, Dr. Colter followed-up with Ms. Acosta concerning her complaint of severe right lower back pain. Dr. Colter continued the prescriptions for pain and muscle spasms and ordered up X-rays of the lumbar and sacral spine. Dr. Colter also requested a consult and patient review by DOC's orthopedist, Dr. Kenneth Sawyer. Dr. Sawyer responded on January 24th recommending additional imaging of the Lumbar Sacral spine and further examination of the right hip area.

On January 26th, Ms. Acosta had X-rays of her lumbar spine. The findings from the X-rays found worsening of the L1 compression fracture with vertebral plana appearance and mild retropulsion, moderate degenerative disc disease L2-L3 with mild disc degeneration at L3-L4 and L4-L5, and moderate L4-L5 facet arthropathy associated with grade 1 degenerative spondylolisthesis.

CP 22.

After x-rays were taken, Ms. Acosta began requesting the self-pay MRI. Unfortunately, her request fell on deaf ears and her request was ignored, although DOC policy 600.020 allows such medical services on a patient paid process.

For unknown reasons, although Ms. Acosta began requesting the MRI in January 2015, it was not until April 22, 2015 that ARNP Saari responded to Ms. Acosta on her self-pay request. CP 24. Respondent presents no cogent reason for its delay in timely responding to Ms. Acosta's requests, and such refusal needlessly continued the pain and disability Ms. Acosta experienced.

Ultimately, Ms. Acosta obtained the MRI on November 24, 2015 and ARNP Saari made a request for an outside surgical consult with the recommended treatment to follow. CP 25-26.

On March 17th, Ms. Acosta saw Nicholas Harrison, PA-C, and Dr. Michael Martin, for an initial consultation and second surgical opinion. It was noted that Ms. Acosta had a chief complaint of one year worsening low back pain with radiating pain, paresthesias, and weakness in the bilateral lower extremities. A recommendation for a laminectomy T12-L3 and fusion T11-L3 was made. It was further noted that Ms. Acosta had spinal stenosis of the lumbar region, wedge compression fracture of unspecified lumbar vertebra, subsequent encounter for fracture with routine healing, and congenital spondylolisthesis. On March 25th, Ms. Acosta was seen in the medical clinic by ARPN Saari and Dr. Colter in follow-up to her visit to Dr. Martin's office. ARPN Saari called Dr. Martin's office and sent an e-mail for the scheduling of Ms. Acosta's back surgery.

CP 27.

Although Ms. Acosta wanted the surgery, again, for unknown reasons, DOC medical staff failed to schedule her surgery. Although surgery was recommended in March, 2016, the surgery did not occur until June 6, 2016. A review of the kites Ms. Acosta sent illustrates the neglect by the DOC staff in ignoring the arranging of her surgery on a timely basis. CP 346-352, 354-55.

After her surgery, Ms. Acosta's condition improved significantly. Her pain was largely diminished, and she was able to take care of her daily needs. CP 356. Again, no reason existed for the delay in care and treatment. Respectfully, respondent's negligence in delaying Ms. Acosta's diagnostic MRI and back surgery caused her needless pain.

VII. CONCLUSION


As set forth above, the Court of Appeals' decision needlessly restricts the res ipsa loquitor doctrine to a situation of rarity. Although Ms. Acosta acknowledges that the doctrine is "sparingly applied", when negligence is established through res ipsa loquitor, it is incumbent upon the responding party to overcome the prima facie case.

Here, the trial court was faced with material issues of fact surrounding the Ms. Acosta's claim, yet granted respondent's summary judgment motion, which the Court of Appeals affirmed. Accordingly, and based upon the aforementioned, res ipsa loquitor applies in Ms. Acosta's case, and Ms. Acosta respectfully requests that this Court accept review of this matter.

Respectfully submitted this 27th day of August, 2020.

HESTER LAW GROUP, INC., P.S.
Attorneys for Petitioner

By:



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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on the day below set forth, I caused a true and correct copy of the document to which this certificate is attached to be served on the following in the manner indicated below:

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- Hand Delivery
- ABC-Legal Messengers
- Email

Signed at Tacoma, Washington this 27th day of August, 2020.



Kathy Herbstler

July 28, 2020

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

LINDA J. ACOSTA,

Appellant,

v.

WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,

Respondent.

No. 52953-0-II

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

WORSWICK, J. — Linda Acosta appeals an order granting summary judgment dismissal of her medical negligence lawsuit against the Department of Corrections (DOC) arising out of the DOC’s delay in allowing Acosta to obtain a medical diagnostic test and subsequent back surgery. She argues that *res ipsa loquitur* applies, thus, expert testimony was not necessary to a determination that the DOC departed from the standard of reasonable, prudent, and appropriate medical care. We disagree and affirm the summary judgment order.

FACTS

I. BACKGROUND

Linda Acosta is currently a 71-year old inmate at the Washington Corrections Center for Women. During her time in incarceration, she has been diagnosed and treated for a multitude of illnesses. Acosta’s medical history includes osteoporosis, degenerative disk disease, and degenerative arthritis in the joints of the spine.

In October 2014, Acosta tripped on a floor mat, fell backward, and suffered an injury to her back. Acosta experienced extreme pain in her right lower back which radiated down to her

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knee. On November 7, Acosta visited the DOC's health clinic where she reported to the DOC advanced registered nurse practitioner Pamelyn Saari that she was unable to get out of bed. Acosta was in a wheelchair and could not walk more than 10 feet because of her injury. Saari explained to Acosta that she should get out of the wheelchair, but reluctantly allowed Acosta to continue its use.

On November 13, Acosta underwent an X-ray which revealed a compressed fracture of her L1 vertebra with over 50 percent loss of the vertebral body. Soon after the X-ray, Acosta requested to see an orthopedic surgeon. Saari explained that she was treating Acosta conservatively. Saari said that she had prescribed medications to treat Acosta's osteoporosis, and that Saari did not believe that an orthopedist would do anything differently. On December 30, Acosta returned to the DOC medical clinic complaining of severe pain in her lower back. DOC medical personnel instructed Acosta to apply ice, walk, and take anti-inflammatories. The next day, Acosta again appeared at the DOC clinic where she declared that she was in a "[m]edical emergency" for pain and inability to stand. Clerk's Papers at 171. She was given Tylenol and an ice pack and referred to physical therapy.

Acosta began requesting an MRI (magnetic resonance imaging) in January 2015, which she intended to pay for herself. The DOC has a process for self-paid medical care that involves a series of specific steps that must be taken by an inmate, including filing paperwork, gathering medical information, paying a processing fee, and depositing the funds necessary to cover the cost of the procedure or appointment. Offenders cannot independently decide or elect to have

medical services performed at their will during incarceration. The DOC permits a self-pay medical procedure or appointment only if it is “medically appropriate.”¹ CP at 445.

Between January 2015 and April 2015, Acosta sent multiple health services kites² to DOC staff, each containing some reference to or inquiry about her MRI appointment. In February, Acosta sent kites to Saari requesting an accommodation for meals and for a wheelchair, but Saari denied her requests, explaining that Acosta needed to continue movement.

Acosta sent multiple kites to Saari in March. Saari replied to all of Acosta’s kites on March 25. Acosta’s March 16 kite inquired whether TRA³ had supplied information on the cost of her MRI, and Saari responded that she “[did not] know.” CP at 284. Acosta’s March 19 kite again inquired if the DOC had received information on her requested MRI. Saari replied, “I don’t know. We told the TRA people about your spine (L spine) and hip areas that need attention. I have not heard a thing.” CP at 285. Acosta’s March 24 kite again requested the status of her MRI. Saari replied that she had “reported the body parts that are requested to be screened,” but she had not heard back. CP at 286.

In May, DOC staff sent Acosta an initial cost estimate obtained from an outside medical provider. Between June and September, Acosta sent four additional kites to DOC staff

¹ Policy number DOC 600.020, titled “Offender-Paid Health Care,” lists criteria for determining what is “medically appropriate,” which requires that the requested service not be provided under the offender health plan, and the likely benefits outweigh the risks of the requested service.

² A “kite” is a form used in prison for communication from inmates to prison staff. *State v. Puapuaga*, 164 Wn.2d 515, 518 n.2, 192 P.3d 360 (2008).

³ “TRA” refers to TRA Medical Imaging, the independent medical imaging company that provided services to the DOC.

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requesting the status of her MRI request. In July, Saari told Acosta that an MRI could be as low as \$1,650, that she had sent estimates for the other sites, and that Acosta should begin depositing funds into a medical account.

On September 11, Acosta submitted an offender complaint, alleging that the DOC was nonresponsive to her requests for an MRI. On September 16, DOC staff responded to the complaint stating, “Ms. Acosta, as soon as DOC publishes the new policy, we will get you sent out.” CP at 409. The DOC offender-paid health care policy was revised on September 21 and outlined the necessary process for approval of self-paid medical services. On September 21, Acosta completed and submitted a worksheet in accordance with that policy. The DOC finally scheduled Acosta’s MRI in October.

On November 24, Acosta’s MRI was performed, and DOC physician Mary Colter then requested Acosta receive an outside surgical consult with recommended treatment. A DOC Care Review Committee Report dated November 11 stated, in part:

“ . . . L-spine MRI indicating she may need urgent decompression, per Radiologist. . . . [January] X-ray findings reviewed by DOC Ortho and discussed. Per DOC Ortho, she needs surgical consultation regardless of physical symptoms. . . .

Intervention Proposed: surgical consultation with treatment as indicated.

CP at 294.

In December, Acosta saw a neurosurgeon, Dr. Marc Goldman, for a surgery consultation related to her L1 compression fracture. In his report, Dr. Goldman stated, “[G]iven the chronicity of this there is no urgency in treatment.” CP at 253. In January 2016, Acosta had a CT (computed tomography) scan of her spine. In February, Acosta saw Dr. Goldman for a

follow up. Dr. Goldman was unsure that surgery would be beneficial and sought a second opinion.

In March, Acosta received an assessment and a second surgical opinion from Dr. Michael Martin and physician assistant Nicholas Harrison. Dr. Martin recommended surgery. Saari then called Dr. Martin's office and sent an e-mail to schedule Acosta's surgery. On April 3, Acosta sent a kite to the DOC asking if her surgery had been scheduled, complaining that her pain was increasing and that she could not sleep. On April 5, Saari replied, "You are scheduled."⁴ CP at 393. On April 7 and April 9, Acosta again inquired about her scheduled surgery, and DOC Health Services Manager Jeff Perry replied that Acosta was going to receive additional imaging.

On April 12, Acosta saw Dr. Colter, complaining of chronic low back pain. Dr. Colter prescribed Acosta narcotic pain medication. Acosta sent five additional kites between April 13 and May 3 requesting notice that her surgery had been scheduled, and DOC staff replied that they were calling the surgeon's scheduler every day, and that her surgery was a priority. Acosta filed a grievance on April 20, complaining of the delay in scheduling her surgery. A DOC grievance coordinator responded on May 6, stating, "I think we have made some progress with your case. Both Dr. Colter and Dr. Anderson⁵ are now involved and have been able to make contact with Dr. Martin's surgery scheduler." CP at 414.

On May 4, Acosta underwent a preoperation assessment and evaluation. Before surgery, Acosta's pain prevented her from performing daily activities such as walking, bathing, dressing

⁴ It appears from the record that the surgery was not scheduled at this time.

⁵ Dr. Mary Lee Colter and Dr. Lisa Longano Anderson are DOC physicians.

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or using the restroom. She needed assistance from others to carry out these tasks. On June 7, Acosta underwent spinal surgery for her L1 compression fracture. After surgery, Acosta's back pain substantially diminished, to where she was able to walk with a walker, and take care of her personal needs.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Acosta filed a medical negligence lawsuit against the DOC related to the treatment she received from the DOC. The DOC filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Acosta could not establish that the medical staff violated the standard of care nor could she establish causation. The DOC submitted declarations from Dr. Colter and Dr. Bede in support of its motion. The declarations from Dr. Colter and Dr. Bede described all of Acosta's medical conditions the DOC was treating, explained the offender-paid health care policy, and opined that DOC medical staff did not violate the standard of care. Dr. Bede declared that an MRI was an appropriate action only after Acosta did not respond to initial conservative treatment. Finally, Dr. Bede opined that no permanent injury was caused to Acosta due to the action or any action of DOC medical personnel.

Acosta did not submit expert testimony, but instead argued that the doctrine of *res ipsa loquitur* applied to her case. As a reply to the *res ipsa loquitur* argument, the DOC submitted additional testimony of Dr. Colter relating the offender-paid healthcare procedures and process. The trial court granted the DOC's motion, ruling that the doctrine of *res ipsa loquitur* did not apply.

Acosta appeals the trial court's order granting summary judgment dismissal.

ANALYSIS

I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. *Keck v. Collins*, 184 Wn.2d 358, 368, 357 P.3d 1080 (2015). Summary judgment is properly granted when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c); *DeYoung v. Providence Med. Ctr.*, 136 Wn.2d 136, 140, 960 P.2d 919 (1998). The defendant may meet this burden by challenging the sufficiency of the plaintiff's evidence. *Young v. Key Pharmaceuticals, Inc.*, 112 Wn.2d 216, 225, 770 P.2d 182 (1989). Whether res ipsa loquitur applies in a given circumstance is a question of law reviewed de novo. *Curtis v. Lein*, 169 Wn.2d 884, 889, 239 P.3d 1078 (2010).

II. LEGAL PRINCIPLES

1. *Statutory Requirements for Medical Malpractice*

In Washington, actions for injuries resulting from health care are governed under chapter 7.70 RCW. To prevail on their claims, plaintiffs must prove

- (1) [t]he health care provider failed to exercise that degree of care, skill, and learning expected of a reasonably prudent health care provider at that time in the profession or class to which he or she belongs, in the state of Washington, acting in the same or similar circumstances;
- (2) Such failure was a proximate cause of the injury complained of.

RCW 7.70.040.

2. *Expert Testimony Required To Establish Standard of Care and Causation*

In a medical negligence action, expert testimony is generally necessary to establish that the health care provider failed to exercise the standard of care of a reasonably prudent health care

provider. *Frausto v. Yakima HMA, LLC*, 188 Wn.2d 227, 232, 393 P.3d 776 (2017). However, the plaintiff can meet this burden by showing that the doctrine of *res ipsa loquitur* applies. See *Miller v. Jacoby*, 145 Wn.2d 65, 33 P.3d 68 (2001) (holding that expert medical testimony was not required to establish that nurse and physician were negligent in failing to completely remove Penrose drain from patient during postoperative procedure). That is, when medical facts are “observable by [a layperson’s] senses and describable without medical training,” a plaintiff can establish the standard of care for a health care provider without expert testimony. *Miller*, 145 Wn.2d 65 at 72 (quoting *Bennett v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus.*, 95 Wn.2d 531, 533, 627 P.2d 104 (1981)).

Expert testimony is also required to establish causation in a medical negligence case. *Frausto*, 188 Wn. 2d at 232. “Like the standard of care, expert testimony is always required except in those few situations where understanding causation ‘does not require technical medical expertise.’” *Frausto*, 188 Wn.2d at 232 (quoting *Young*, 112 Wn.2d at 228). Here, it is undisputed that Acosta failed to submit expert testimony to establish either negligence or causation. Instead, she relies on the doctrine of *res ipsa loquitur* to establish the first element, and her personal testimony to establish the second.

III. RES IPSA LOQUITUR DOES NOT APPLY

Acosta argues that *res ipsa loquitur* applies because the DOC’s delay in scheduling her MRI and surgery would not have occurred in the absence of negligence. In making this argument, she is defining the “occurrence producing the injury” as the DOC’s *delay* in obtaining her MRI. Br. of Appellant at 9 (quoting *Miller*, 145 Wn.2d at 65). Conversely, the DOC argues that its medical treatment was not of a kind that ordinarily does not happen absent negligence. In

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making this argument, the DOC is defining the “occurrence” as the DOC’s *medical treatment of Acosta’s injured back*. We agree with the DOC.

To prevail on a complaint for medical negligence, a plaintiff must satisfy traditional tort elements of proof: duty, breach, injury, and proximate cause. *Dunnington v. Virginia Mason Med. Ctr.*, 187 Wn.2d 629, 636, 389 P.3d 498 (2017). The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur provides a fact finder with an inference of the defendant’s breach of duty, thus allowing a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of negligence when he cannot prove a specific act of negligence. *Brugh v. Fun-Tastic Rides Co.*, 8 Wn. App. 2d 176, 180, 437 P.3d 751 (2019).

Under some circumstances, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can apply to physicians and hospitals. *ZeBarth v. Swedish Hosp. Med. Ctr.*, 81 Wn.2d 12, 18, 499 P.2d 1 (1972). Res ipsa loquitur is “ordinarily sparingly applied, ‘in peculiar and exceptional cases, and only where the facts and the demands of justice make its application essential.’” *Curtis*, 169 Wn.2d at 889 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting *Tinder v. Nordstrom, Inc.*, 84 Wn. App. 787, 792, 929 P.2d 1209 (1997)).

The doctrine applies only when the evidence shows:

- (1) the accident or occurrence producing the injury is of a kind which ordinarily does not happen in the absence of someone’s negligence, (2) the injuries are caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant, and (3) the injury-causing accident or occurrence is not due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff.

Pacheco v. Ames, 149 Wn.2d 431, 436, 69 P.3d 324 (2003).

The first element is satisfied if one of three conditions is present:

- (1) When the act causing the injury is so palpably negligent that it may be inferred as a matter of law, i.e., leaving foreign objects, sponges, scissors, etc., in the body, or amputation of a wrong member; (2) when the general experience and observation of mankind teaches that the result would not be

expected without negligence; and (3) when proof by experts in an esoteric field creates an inference that negligence caused the injuries.

Zukowsky v. Brown, 79 Wn.2d 586, 595, 488 P.2d 269 (1971)).

The second element, exclusive control, includes situations when the defendant has the right of control, as in a nondelegable duty, as when the defendant has actual physical control of the agency. *Hogland v. Klein*, 49 Wn.2d 216, 219, 298 P.2d 1099 (1956).

The third element requires the court to consider whether the plaintiff's injury was due to her voluntary action or inaction. *Zukowsky*, 79 Wn.2d at 595. This element can include plaintiff's negligence or assumption of the risk. *Zukowsky*, 79 Wn.2d at 595.

1. *Accident or Occurrence Producing the Injury of a Kind Which Ordinarily Does Not Happen in the Absence of Someone's Negligence*

To apply *res ipsa loquitur*, the evidence has to show that that the occurrence producing Acosta's injury is of the type which does not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence. *Pacheco*, 149 Wn.2d at 436. Acosta can meet this element by meeting one of three conditions. Acosta appears to argue only the first two conditions: whether the act causing the injury is so palpably negligent that it may be inferred as a matter of law, and whether the general experience and observation of mankind teaches that the result would not be expected without negligence. Acosta meets neither condition.

Regarding the first condition, the evidence does not show that the occurrence producing her injury is of the type which does not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence. As mentioned above, Acosta narrowly defines the "occurrence" as the DOC's delay in obtaining her MRI. This is too narrow a view. But even if we accept this argument at face value, the evidence does not show that a delay in obtaining a medical test is the type of occurrence that does not

ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence. To the contrary, there can be a multitude of reasons for the DOC's delay in obtaining a self-paid MRI.

For example, the evidence here shows that the MRI request required a DOC medical care staff member to deem it "medically appropriate" before it could be approved. Acosta argues that the delay here was caused by ineptitude and lies, but the particular facts regarding this delay are not determinative. Our focus in analyzing this element of *res ipsa loquitur* is whether *a delay* in obtaining a medical test is the type of occurrence that does not *normally occur* in the absence of negligence. It is not, and Acosta's argument fails on this point.

Viewing the issue as more properly framed by the DOC, that we consider all of the DOC's medical treatment for Acosta's injury, her failure of proof is even more evident. Acosta filed a medical malpractice action, which generally requires expert testimony that the medical care provider violated the applicable standard of care. *Frausto*, 188 Wn.2d at 232. Acosta makes no effort to argue that the DOC's medical treatment of her back injury is the type of occurrence that normally occurs in the absence of negligence. And a review of the evidence shows that the DOC's conservative treatment of her lumbar spine fracture is not the type of occurrence which ordinarily does not happen in the absence of negligence. In fact, the DOC submitted Dr. Bede's declaration showing that the DOC's actions in this regard were not negligent, but instead were within the standard of care in this case.

During the entire time in question, Acosta was receiving medical care for the fall she suffered in October 2014, and the record contains declarations from experts that describe that care as meeting the requisite standard of care for medical professionals. Her medical providers, the same people to review and possibly approve her MRI request, were unsure of the cause of her

pain or the benefit of surgery. These facts take this case out of the realm of “palpable negligence” where this doctrine would normally apply, i.e., drilling in the wrong side of a patient’s jaw, leaving foreign objects in the body, or amputation of a wrong member. *Pacheco*, 149 Wn.2d at 438; *Zukowsky*, 79 Wn.2d at 595.

Nor does the evidence establish the second condition: whether the general experience and observation of mankind teaches that the result would not be expected without negligence. It is simply not within the general experience of mankind that the *result* claimed here—pain and suffering experienced prior to back surgery—would not be expected without negligence. Although Acosta appears to blame this result on the delay, our consideration of this condition looks to the injury, not the cause. *Brugh*, 8 Wn. App. 2d at 184.

We hold that the evidence does not show that the accident or occurrence producing the injury is of a kind which ordinarily does not happen in the absence of someone’s negligence. Because Acosta fails on proving one of the necessary elements of the doctrine of *res ipsa loquitur*, the doctrine is not applicable in this case and we need not consider the sufficiency of the other required elements.

IV. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS PROPER

The DOC argues that the summary judgment dismissal was proper because Acosta did not provide expert testimony on the standard of care or causation. We agree.

1. *Standard of Care*

To establish the standard of care, Acosta must prove that “[t]he health care provider failed to exercise that degree of care, skill, and learning expected of a reasonably prudent health care provider at that time in the profession or class to which he or she belongs, in the state of

Washington, acting in the same or similar circumstances.” RCW 7.70.040(1). Because *res ipsa loquitur* does not apply here, Acosta must prove this element with expert testimony. *Frausto*, 188 Wn.2d at 232. Acosta has offered no competent evidence about the standard of care in her case, thus, she has not raised an issue of material fact as to the standard of care.

2. Causation

Acosta argues, without citation to authority, that expert testimony is not required to prove causation in her case, and that she is qualified to testify to her pain and suffering. Acosta seems to argue that causation in her case falls within one of the narrow exceptional cases our Supreme Court discusses in *Young v. Key Pharmaceuticals, Inc.*, where “the determination of negligence does not require technical medical expertise.” 112 Wn.2d at 228. We disagree.

To establish causation, the plaintiff must show that the alleged breach of the standard of care “was a proximate cause of the injury complained of.” RCW 7.70.040(2). The exceptional cases mentioned by the Supreme Court in *Young* that “[do] not require technical medical expertise” include “amputating the wrong limb or poking a patient in the eye while stitching a wound on the face.” 112 Wn.2d at 228. In *Young*, our Supreme Court held that lay testimony could be admitted “to show obvious impairments,” and is “sometimes admissible for matters such as observations of health, disease, or injury,” but that even a pharmacist was not competent to testify as to causation between a physician defendant’s conduct and those observed impairments. 112 Wn.2d at 228.

Here, although Acosta’s pain and suffering may be obvious to her, it is the causation of that pain and suffering that is at issue. Because Acosta has offered no competent evidence about


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
the proximate cause of the injury complained of, she has not raised an issue of material fact as to proximate cause.

V. CONCLUSION

We hold that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply, thus the evidence is not sufficient to raise genuine issues of material fact for each element of Acosta's claim. Moreover, Acosta failed to raise an issue of material fact as to proximate cause. Thus, trial court's summary judgment dismissal is affirmed.

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.


Worswick, J.


Melnick, J.


Sutton, A.C.J.

HESTER LAW GROUP, INC., P.S.

August 27, 2020 - 12:46 PM

Filing Petition for Review

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